BRICS seek to rebalance the present global order, by Martine Bulard (Le Monde diplomatique

There was an unusual flurry of diplomacy this summer, with two international summits particularly noteworthy for being hosted by South Africa and India, neither part of the Western world. Hard on the heels of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) summit in Johannesburg (22-24 August) came that of the G20 (1) in New Delhi (9-10 September). This accident of scheduling pointed up the differences between the two bodies and the world views they represent.

Before Johannesburg, observers said the BRICS summit was doomed to fail, or would be paralysed by disputes between India and China, but the group showed its vitality by announcing six new members from January 2024 — Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Some commentators saw this enlargement as a historic turning point, others merely as a PR coup. Neither reaction may be quite right, but what is certain is that more than 20 further countries are currently hoping for admission.

The G20 summit was expected to see the West make a comeback after the recent challenges to its dominance from the countries of the global South (2). But it failed to impose its worldview, and in some respects lost ground. The final statement of the 2022 summit in Bali had deplored the ‘aggression by the Russian Federation against Ukraine’, but the Financial Times noted that the New Delhi declaration ‘refers only to the “war in Ukraine”, a formulation that supporters of Kyiv such as the US and NATO allies have previously rejected as it implies both sides are equally complicit … a blow to western countries that have spent the past year attempting to convince developing countries to condemn Moscow and support Ukraine’ (3). The South condemns the war, but rejects the Western narrative.

The 2023 G20 summit did see the admission of the African Union (on the same footing as the EU), which may signal greater openness. But it’s unlikely to change the balance of power. To distract from the disappointment of the New Delhi summit, the White House and its friends in the media focused on US president Joe Biden’s unanimously welcomed proposal to create a trade corridor linking India to Europe via the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel, which will include a railway, a submarine cable and a hydrogen pipeline. European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen enthusiastically described it as ‘much more than just a railway or a cable. It is a green and digital bridge across continents and civilisations.’

The corridor’s route is uncertain and its funding yet to be secured. At last year’s G20 summit, Biden floated the idea of a Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) to counter China’s Belt and Road initiative, but the money expected to flood in has been a trickle at best. Meanwhile, the rest of the world has come up with its own corridors, including the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), linking notably Russia, Iran and India, soon to be joined by Turkey, Oman and Kazakhstan. The success of the Johannesburg summit is further proof that the West’s development promises are not enough to recruit poor and emerging countries to its cause.

Making the acronym a reality

To gauge how far the BRICS have come, it’s worth remembering the term was coined in 2001 by Goldman Sachs economist Jim O’Neill. He didn’t include South Africa, and the final small ‘s’ merely indicated a plural. The BRICs were not yet a formal group and O’Neill’s aim was simply to highlight their rapid economic growth. As his colleagues Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman later put it: ‘If things go right, in less than 40 years, the BRICs economies together could be larger than the G6 [the world’s six richest countries]’ (4).

The original four BRICs, then in talks with Western countries aimed at rapid liberalisation of trade across all sectors, decided to make the acronym a reality and met for the first time in Russia in 2009, then in Brazil in 2010, and China in 2011, when South Africa became a full member. The BRICS are now a formal group and this year’s summit was their 15th such event.

The BRICS group is not run on conventional lines, with a permanent director, secretariat etc. The country hosting the annual summit assumes the presidency for 12 months; an advisor and deputy advisor from each member country plan it; and decisions are taken by consensus. In other words, whatever the members’ opinions of each other, the decision to admit the six new members in January 2024 was unanimous.

Americans are shocked by the idea that China is not taking the place that the US has assigned it in the American-led international order … Most nations refuse to choose between a US that is essential for their security and a China that is essential for their continued prosperity

Graham Allison

The criteria for admitting new members are unclear. Algeria believed its membership was a done deal thanks to Russia’s support, and was sorely disappointed not to be admitted. It’s likely that its long-running diplomatic disputes with Morocco outweighed the strength of its economy.

Economic interests are naturally important in the choice of new members. It’s clear that Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iran and, to a lesser extent, Egypt can contribute much on the energy front: the 11 members of what will be known as the BRICS+ control more than 54% of the world’s oil production, which gives them clout. Brazil, China, Russia and South Africa also have some of the world’s largest deposits of rare earth metals, vital to high-tech industry, and China already accounts for more than two thirds of global production. Argentina is one of the world’s largest producers of wheat, soya and beef.

High-value agriculture sales

Researcher Sébastien Abis notes that with Russian grain, Iranian saffron and pistachios, Ethiopian coffee and sesame, and Egyptian oranges and onions, the group will ‘account for 23% of global agricultural sales (by value), compared with 16% at the beginning of the century’ (5) — which gives it significant weight on the markets and enables it to provide food aid to poorer countries, boosting its influence.

Geopolitical considerations are never far from the BRICS group’s minds. This applies not only to China but also Brazil, whose president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva ‘plead[ed] for [his] Argentine brothers to be permitted to join’ (6), with the aim of helping his counterpart Alberto Fernández (struggling in the run-up to the presidential election on 22 October) and at the same time strengthening the mutually profitable development of Brazil’s fourth-largest trading partner (after China, the EU and the US).

Lula’s efforts may fail, since both of Fernández’s main opponents have made it clear that they would not take Argentina into the BRICS if elected. Javier Milei, rising star of the far right, even said, ‘I will not talk to the communists [China and Brazil], under any circumstances’ (see Which right will be right for Argentine voters?, in this issue).

In the Middle East, it’s no surprise that Iran (a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (7) since 2021) and Saudi Arabia are to be admitted. Early this year, under the auspices of Beijing, the two countries resumed diplomatic relations, which Saudi Arabia had broken off in 2016. It’s easy to see why Xi Jinping was keen to have them in the BRICS. But Indian prime minister Narendra Modi, who met Iran’s foreign minister in New Delhi last year, was also positive about its admission.

India already has close economic links with Iran and, moreover, has no intention of allowing China to occupy centre stage. As mentioned earlier, the countries are linked by the INSTC corridor, and trade between them, though still modest, is growing rapidly despite US pressure. Last year India’s exports to Iran rose by 44% and the total value of trade between the two reached $2.5bn.

Egypt now a key player

The surprise admission of Egypt may be due to Cairo being the base of the Arab League — which Xi Jinping wants to honour because it supports his policy (on the Uyghur Muslims) in Xinjiang — but there is also the fact that Egypt controls the Suez Canal. Egypt is therefore a key geostrategic player. Moreover, China has close links with Ethiopia, an important staging post on its new silk road (the Belt and Road initiative), and may be hoping to score another diplomatic success by helping it resolve its dispute with Egypt over the Renaissance Dam, which Ethiopia has built on the Blue Nile (8). China wants to establish itself as a peacemaker, while accusing the US of sowing division and war across the world.

Is the BRICS enlargement the start of an antiliberal, anti-Western political bloc? The Johannesburg declaration is unambiguous. It does not promote an alternative economic model. Just like a Western organisation, the BRICS group sings the virtues of free trade agreements (and of public-private partnerships, though it’s well known that the public sector pays while the private sector reaps the rewards) — two examples among others.

The BRICS are not creating an anti-Western front in geopolitical terms either. Nor any kind of united front. Indeed, the group’s two giants, India and China, regularly clash militarily on their Himalayan border. And no sooner was the Johannesburg summit over than China’s natural resources ministry published a map laying claim to disputed land on that border. The claim was not entirely new, but is totally unacceptable under international law. Meanwhile, India is taking part in the US-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or ‘Quad’, intended to counter China’s rise. In the Middle East, the UAE and Saudi Arabia host US military bases, while Egypt — the second-largest recipient of US aid after Israel — has further strengthened its security partnership with Washington. No one wants to overturn the international order, but they do hope to change it.

‘Today’s global governance structures reflect yesterday’s world … They must reform to reflect today’s power and economic realities’ (9), as UN secretary-general António Guterres put it. The Johannesburg declaration also calls for ‘greater representation of emerging markets and developing countries, in international organisations and multilateral fora in which they play an important role’. It lists the major issues to be addressed and calls for a review of the weight assigned to each country on IMF bodies (10) (‘quotas’) and reform of the UN, including its Security Council, to allow developing countries ‘including South Africa, Brazil and India’ to play a greater role, something China has until now opposed.

But the ‘old world’, led by the US, won’t hear of it, horrified at the thought of sharing power with previously subordinate countries. Graham Allison of Harvard University says, ‘Americans are shocked by the idea that China is not taking the place that the US has assigned it in the American-led international order’ (11). China long accepted this position, but has realised since the 2008 financial crisis that it would never be treated as an equal (12). It is not alone in feeling the injustice of the present international order, but it has the economic and financial means to take others with it — which explains the success of this year’s BRICS summit.

The Johannesburg declaration underscores ‘the importance of encouraging the use of local currencies [instead of the US dollar] in international trade and financial transactions between BRICS as well as their trading partners’. This is already up and running, even if dollar-based transactions still dominate. The mechanism for mutual aid in case of a crisis (the Contingent Reserve Arrangement) has also been strengthened and membership of the BRICS group’s multilateral development bank (New Development Bank) has been extended to countries that can contribute funds, such as the UAE. The BRICS are arming themselves financially.

In other words the Johannesburg summit shouldn’t be viewed through the lens of the past. The BRICS group is neither a diplomatic courtship dance, nor an alliance on NATO lines, but reflects the ability of emerging countries to enter into pacts according to their national interests — not just because they are members of an ideological camp, as during the cold war. In fact, as Allison explains, ‘most nations refuse to choose between a US that is essential for their security and a China that is essential for their continued prosperity.’ But their differences don’t rule out working together for a new global order. That’s already happening.